ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
An elementary logical statement 1s the basic unit of any logic system, in the sense that it is the smallest logical unit to which a truth value can be assigned within the system One of the most fundamental ways of dividing the general field of logic is by the way statements are analyzed In propositional logic, elementary statements are treated as unanalyzed units; in predicate logic, an elementary statement asserts that a particular object has a particular attribute or that a particular set of objects stand in a particular relation to one another; and in set logic, an elementary statement asserts that an object belongs to a particular set.
In the following section we discuss propositional logic, considering both the traditional binary truth value systems and multlvalent fuzzy systems. The latter discussion concentrates on multivalent logical operations that follow the axioms of continuous triangular norms (T-norms) and their dual triangular conorms (Schwelzer and Sklar [1, 2] ) Drawing upon recent work on the nonstandard inference modes of confirmation and denial (Bandler and Kohout [3] , Hall [4], Schwartz [5]), we derive "augmented" versions of modus ponens and modus tollens for multlvalent logic, using the method of "residuation" (Trillas and Valverde [6] ) to derive both an upper bound and a lower bound for the inferred truth value; these bounds often coincide, yielding a unique answer Two additional modes of inference, presumption and prejudice, are derived using the same techniques; these modes entail a lower bound on the truth of the antecedent and an upper bound on the truth of the consequent from knowledge of the truth of the implication alone
The third section presents a parallel development of similar results for the case of predicate logic It concludes with a simple demonstration of "knowledge base psychosis," in which multiple rules of fuzzy predicate logic interact to preclude the denial of any base value of the antecedent variable due to presumption, and to preclude the affirmation of any base value of the consequent variable due to prejudice
In the fourth section we consider inferences derived from a more fundamental grounding in set logic We consider a single primary universe of discourse consisting of objects that are classified into fuzzy subsets on the basis of the values of several attributes; an inference rule in this sytem consists of the assertion that all objects belong to a consequent fuzzy subset C at least as strongly as they belong to an antecedent fuzzy subset A. In this environment, ordinary fuzzy modus ponens and modus tollens are well-defined according to the "standard strict" lmphcatlon operator and the compositional rule of inference, but confirmation, denial, presumption, and prejudice are not derivable. Thus, no a priori constraints are placed on the antecedent or the consequent from these studies ~s that different situations appear to require different implication operators.
Modus ponens allows us to infer a lower bound for Tr(C), the truth value of the consequent, from the truth value of the imphcation Tr(A --, C) and the truth value of the antecedent Tr(A); this lower bound is equal to the truth value of "A and (ff A then C)," where "and" is defined by the modus ponens generating function mp (Tnllas and Valverde [6] ) proper to the implication operator I that is used to define "if then" It is very important to note, however, that confirmation and demal Deld no useful results unless the lmphcatlon is at least partially false; when "If A then C" has a truth value of 1, denial assigns the trivial upper bound of 1 to the truth value of C and confirmation assigns the trivial lower bound of 0 to the truth value of A. 2 (See Hall [4] and Schwartz [5] .) The deductwe power of both confirmatson and denial decreases monotomcally as the truth value of the lmphcatlon increases, m the sense that the bounds they impose on the consequent and the antecedent, respectively, become less restrlctwe the closer the implication comes to being strictly true. With respect to the other argument, confirmation most strongly constrains the antecedent when the truth value of the consequent is high, while demal most strongly constrains the consequent when the truth value of the antecedent is low.
Gwen the existence of both an upper and a lower bound on the truth value of the consequent, we define augmented modus ponens as an interval-valued function whose result gives both an upper and lower bound on the truth value of the consequent as a joint funcuon of the truth values of the antecedent and of the lmphcatmn ~tself. When Tr(A --* C) = 1, these intervals give no more mformauon than the tradmonal bounds provided by modus ponens and modus tollens. When TR(A C) is strictly less than 1, augmented modus ponens yields a unique value for Tr(C) in the logic systems based on the R-lmphcatlons R1 (Lukaslewlcz), R2 (quotient), and R 3 (Brouwer) and m the logic systems based on the Simplications 11 (Lukaslewicz) and 12 (probabdlsuc), since the lower bound on Tr(C) given by mp(a, t ) is equal to the upper bound gwen by md(a, t ) for all t < 1 under these logics. The inferred interval for the S-lmphcaUon I3 (KleeneDlenes) also contains only a single point when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 except in the special case where Tr(A) and TR(A -o C) are equal. Simtlarly, augmented modus tollens yields a unique value for Tr(A) when TR(A ---, C) < 1 in the systems Rl, R2, Ii, and I2, since mc(y, t) = mt(y, t). For I3 the value is again umque except when Tr(A) = Tr(A --* C), whale for R3 augmented modus tollens always yields a nondegenerate interval of possible truth values of the antecedent A.
The modes of confirmation and demal are closely related to two simpler modes, which we may call the mode of presumption and the mode ofprejudwe.
In these inference modes, the truth value of the imphcauon alone places hmlts on the respective truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. According to the mode of prejudice, the truth value of the consequent is always less than or equal to the truth value of the lmphcaUon According to the mode of presumption, the truth of the antecedent is at least as great as a function of the truth value of the implication, the form of this funcUon varies depending on which lmphcatlon operator is used Tr(A) > 1 -Tr(A ~ C) under the logic systems/1 (Lukaslewicz),/2 (probabdlstlc), and/3 (Kleene-Dlenes), Tr(A) _> Tr(A ---, C) when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 under the logic system R3 (Brouwer'), and Tr(A) > 0 when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 under the logic system R2 (quotient). Presumption and preju&ce can be observed even m the classical system of two-valued logic. When the truth value of an implication is zero m two-valued logic, then "C or Not A" is a completely false statement This lmphes that "Not (C or Not A)" is a completely true statement "Not (C or Not A)" ~s eqmvalent to "A and Not C," so the crxsp denial of "IfA then C" ensures that A Is crisply true (presumption) and that C is crisply false (preJudice). On the other hand, when the truth value of the lmpllcatton is 1, the upper bound for C IS Presumption and Prejudice m Logical Inference 365 1 and the lower bound for A Is 0, yielding no mformauon at all. In multwalent logic, when the truth value of the implication is neither zero nor one, presumption gwes a nontnvlal lower bound for the truth value of A and prejudice gives a nontrlvlal upper bound for the truth value of C In the case of the S-lmphcaUons, presumption and prejudice can be easily verified from the equivalence between "IfA then C" and "C or Not A ," since Tr(C) < TR(C or Not A) (preJudice), and the fact that Tr(Not A) < Tr(C or Not A) lmphes that Tr(A) _> Tr[Not (C or Not A)] (presumpuon)
In the case of R-lmphcatlons, prejudice follows directly from the fact that the modus ponens generating function of any R implication is a T-norm one of whose arguments is the truth value of the lmphcatlon, since the value computed from a T-norm can never exceed either of its arguments Presumption ts more difficult with R implications, and in some cases (such as the quotient logic R2) yields only the nearly trivial constraint that the truth value of the antecedent is strictly greater than zero when the truth value of the ~mpllcaUon ~s not equal to one For logic systems whose lmphcaUon operators are neither R-lmphcatlons nor S-lmphcatlons, such as early Zadeh or quantum logic (Trlllas and Valverde [6] ), It Is necessary to verify separately each of the six reference modes of modus ponens, modus tollens, confirmation, demal, presumption, and prejudice While demal reqmres mformat~on about both the truth of A and the truth of the lmphcat~on m order to specify the least upper bound on the truth of C, it often yields httle or no reformation about C that could not have been derived from the truth of the lmphcatlon alone using presumption Unless the truth of A Is close to the lower bound given by presumpUon, the upper bound for the truth of C gwen by demal Is not substanually different from that gwen by prejudice for most common lmphcatlon operators For Lukaslewlcz logic (11, R1), denial vanes hnearly with Tr(A); for quotient logic (R2), demal always vanes more slowly than Tr(A), for probabfllStlC logic (I2), denial varies more slowly than Tr(A ) when the latter is close to one but more rapidly when it is close to zero In the Brouwer logic system (R3) and the Kleene-Dlenes logic system (13), the bound gwen by demal is everywhere identical to the bound given by presumption Similarly, the lower bounds on the truth of A prowded by confirmation and by presumption are only shghtly different in many cases ano everywhere identical for R3 and 13 Table 1 summarizes the six modes of reference for the logic systems stemming from each of the five most ~mportant R and S ~mphcaUon operators
The fact that the inference modes of presumption and prejudice are syntactically vahd leads to unfortunate consequences when mult~valent propos~-Uonal logic is used for knowledge-based systems Ordinarily when we give a truth value to an lmphcaUon rule, we want higher truth values to generate stronger rules and lower truth values to generate weaker ones. However, lowering the truth value of an lmphcatlon nile makes it more powerful with Table 1 resepct to presumption, prejudice, confirmation, and denial whale a makes the rule weaker with respect to modus ponens and modus tollens. Even worse, presumption means that implications with low truth values generally impose unwanted restrictions on the input data However, propositional logic is primarily concerned with absolute statements expressed as unique propositions, so perhaps it Is not surprising that a propositional knowledge base handles input data coming from an application environment poorly. Thus, we now turn our attention to predicate logic, which is currently the most widely used logic for knowledge-based systems
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PREDICATE LOGIC
The basic form of an imphcation rule under predicate logic is "If X is A then Yls C," or "IfA(X) then C(Y)" for short. Xand Yare variables with their respective universes of discourse, and A and C are predicates that constrain the values of X and Y. The meaning is that if the predicate A is true of the quantity X, then the predicate C is also true of the quantity Y Our focus will be on implication rules for approximate reasoning in which A and C are fuzzy predicates that impose elastic constraints on X and Y by restricting them to fuzzy subsets of their respective umverses of discourse. If the variable X takes on a Regardless of which imphcation operator is used, some of the difficulties inherent in approximate reasoning with proposmonal logic recur in predicate logic when we try to interpret the meaning of the individual membership grade #A~c(X,, Yj) of an (X,, yj) pair In the Implication relation. Most fundamentally this membership grade IS the truth value of the implication "If x, belongs to the hypothetical value A, then yj belongs to the hypothetical value C " Interpreted as such, all of the modes of inference discussed for propositional logic are perfectly valid: #A-.c(X,, Yj) by itself gives a correct lower bound on #A(x,) through presumption and a correct upper bound on #c(Yj) through prejudice, #A~c(X,, Y~) and #A (X,) together give correct bounds for gc(Yj) through modus ponens and demal; and #A-c(X,, Yj) and gc(Y~) together give correct bounds for #A (X,) through modus tollens and confirmation, where by "correct bounds" we simply mean that the actual truth value of the fuzzy predicate m question for any specific x, or yj is within the range specified by the inference.
Although this interpretanon allows sound inference with respect to the hypothencal values A and C, such references are of httle or no practical benefit Apphed approximate reasoning reqmres that the knowledge contained m the lmpllcanon rules be applicable to data arising outside the system To do th~s, we take #A~c(X,, Yj) to be the truth value of the lmpllcanon "If X is x, then Y ~s
Yj
In the typical case, generahzed modus ponens ~s then performed using external data about the perceived value of X to make inferences about the unknown value of Y The inferred poss~blhty of each yj is found in two stages
The first stage ~s to use each x,'s membership grade in the external datum "X ~s A'" as a truth value for the crisp proposmon "X is x," in order to perform generalized modus ponens, yielding one lower bound for the truth of" Y is y/' per base value m the X universe of discourse"
The second stage is to combine these lower bounds into an overall truth value for "Y is yj." This is generally done using the max operator $3, although it may be more appropriate to use the conorm proper to the logic system m use (when this system ~s not R3 or I3). Taken together, the truth values for each individual base value yj, reinterpreted as membership grades, determine C', the inferred predicate on the Y um,,erse of discourse However, this procedure leads to a paradox, because ff gA~c(X,, Yj) IS less than 1, presumpnon imposes a pnon restrictions on what truth values for "X is x," may be asserted, while prejudice ~mposes a prior1 restrictions on what truth values for "Y is y/' may be referred. And these restrictions on truth values carry over into a pnon restrlcUons on membership grades in A' and C', respectively. In a mulnrule system, the presumptions and prejudices Imposed by the various rules may aggregate to form a "knowledge base psychos~s" m which no X value can be denied without wolatlng the presumpnon of some rule, and no Y value can be affirmed w~thout violating some rule's prejudice) Table 2 shows a simple example of knowledge base psychosis using the Formally, any set of axioms that asserts these two rules and also asserts any predicate other than "undefined" for Y or any predicate other than "unknown" for X is logically inconsistent For a multwalent logic system to be simultaneously useful and logically grounded, a way must be found to preserve modus ponens with respect to external data without simultaneously subjecting that data to presumption and prejudice One promising approach, which we now take up, is a return to the foundations of approximate reasoning, the theory of fuzzy subsets (Zadeh [16] )
SET LOGIC
In set logic, the concept of lmphcatlon is replaced with the more fundamental concept of set inclusion; the set logic relaUon corresponding to "If A then C" is "All A's are C's," or "Ifp is an .4 thenp is a C." The latter representation is formally similar to the propositional implication "IfX is A then Y is C" except that both the antecedent and the consequent in the set logic form refer to a common universe of discourse Depending on the context, the elements of this universe may be referred to as objects, cases, possible worlds, or some term more specific to the apphcaUon.
The correspondence between set logic and propositional logic can be further enhanced by using the obJect-attribute--value formahsm. If we define the set `4 in "Ifp is an`4 thenp is a C" as the set of object whose X attribute is in the set ofXvalues A and define the set C as the set of objects whose Y attribute is in the set of Y values C, then the antecedent and consequent of the set logic version express exactly the same information as the antecedent and consequent, respectively, of the propositional logic version discussed above. In this case, the rule takes the form "If Xp IS in `4 then Yp is m C," where Xp and Yp are the values of the two attributes X and Y for a single object p--for example, the height and weight of a particular person Despite the eqmvalence m expressive power between the two logical systems, the natural rules of reference differ strongly when the sets or equivalent propositions involved are fuzzy ones The most straightforward interpretation of "Ifp is an `4 then p is a C" IS that the membership grade of any object p in C is at least as great as its membership gr,~ 4.e in A"
#A (P) < l~c(P)
Definmg .4 and C as before m terms of attributes X and Y, we have
#A (P) = ttA (Xp)
and
Izc(P) = I~c(YP)
Then we can state the set inclusion, or lmphcatlon, relation In terms of these values: If we know the precise value of Xp, we can use modus ponens to make an inference about the value of Yp for the same object The first step is to find the degree to which Xp belongs to A; denote that membership grade as a Note that a IS also the membership grade of object p in A, and by the implication relation we can infer that the membership grade ofp in C is greater than or equal to a; in other words, p is an element of the a-cut Ca, defined as the set of objects whose membership in C is _~< a. This In turn is equivalent to saying that p's value on attribute Y, Yp, belongs to the a-cut Ca, the set of Y values that belong to C at least to degree a. Since a IS here a crisp value, Ca is a crisp subset of the Y universe of discourse. In many apphcatlons A and C will be convex fuzzy sets, so a crisp value for Xp causes us to infer a crisp interval of values for Yp
If the value of Xp is given as a fuzzy subset A' of the universe of X values, the principle is the same although the procedure is more complicated /~A (Xp) becomes #A (A'), the degree to which the fuzzy set A' belongs to the fuzzy set A. This membership grade is a fuzzy subset of the universe of ordinary membership grades, given by the following formula
IXA( A ') = ~ I~A ,(X) "7 A(X)
This IS also the membership grade of the object p in the fuzzy set of objects A
I.tA(p) = "~. tLA t(x) "7
which by the implication rule gives a fuzzy lower bound on the grade of membership of p In C:
#c(p)> ~ #At (X)p~4(X)
and hence a fuzzy lower bound on the grade of membership of Yp In the fuzzy subset C of the universe of Y values
~c(yp)> ~ x #A' (X)I~A(X)
Taking Into account the fact that two or more x values In the X universe of discourse may have the same membership grade in A, we can rewrite this as
#c(yp)> ~ SUpx{~A'(X): #A(X)=a}

Ol ot
Each element a of this fuzzy set of membership grades corresponds to an a-cut Ca = {y: #c(Y) -> a } derived from the fuzzy set C given in the rule. Using the Presumption and Prejudice in Logical Inference 373 resolution identity of fuzzy mathematics (Zadeh [17, 18] ), we can combine these a-cuts according to the membership grades of their corresponding a values to form the fuzzy set C', which is our best inference of the value of Yp: C' =LJ SUpx{~A ,(x): /zA (x) = a}C~ a C' is thus the fuzzy set defined by the fuzzy set of a-cuts of C, m other words, by an a-cut of C for which a is itself a fuzzy set of membership grades
In the case of a crisp data value for Xp, Xp = x, it is easy to show that this version of modus ponens in fuzzy set logic is equivalent to the use of the standard strict lmphcation operator in fuzzy propostmnal modus ponens; m both cases, the grade of membership of a particular Ys m C' is 1 if #A(x,) -< /~c(Yj) and 0 otherwise. The two versions of modus ponens are also equivalent in the case of fuzzy data, the proof, which is omitted here, centers on expressing the inferred C' of propositmnal modus ponens in terms of its a-cuts using the resolution principle Despite this equivalence, the problems posed by the modes of presumptmn and prejudice do not arise If a particular (x,, yj) pair has a membership grade of zero in the fuzzy set implication (inclusion) relation, this asserts only that there exists no p such that Xp = x, and Yp = yj. Without additional informatmn about Yp this leaves Xp unconstrained, and without information about Xp, Yp is similarly unconstrained The fact that the equivalent operation to modus ponens results in a specific fuzzy set of possible values of Yp rather than a lower bound on memberships m this set makes consideratmn of denial unnecessary Fuzzy set logic obeys the law of contrapositive symmetry (A -, C is equivalent to Not C --, Not A) since IZA(P) <--#c(P) lmplies that/£NotC(P) ~-~ /ZNotA (P) Because of this, all of the results given above for modus ponens (and for prejudice and denial) are also true, mutatls mutandzs, for modus tollens (and for presumption and confirmation)
To summarize, fuzzy set logic succeeds in preserving generallzatmn of the classically valid forms modus ponens and modus tollens, while eliminating the aberrant forms confirmatmn, denial, presumption, and prejudice. But by mandating the standard strict implication operator, it incurs the cost of requiring a degree of crispness in fuzzy implication that, whale convement for some applications, Is quite inappropriate in others.
EXAMPLE: FAST DRIVING IMPLIES POOR FUEL ECONOMY Propositional Logic
Implication in propositional logic connects two unanalyzed sentences or proposlUons. Suppose we have the two propositions "You drive fast" or "Your fuel economy Is poor" and the imphcatlon "If you drive fast then your fuel economy is poor." If we take the lmphcatlon to be completely true, this tells us nothing a priori about the lndwldual truth values of "You drive fast" and "Your fuel economy is poor"; but, gwen any specific truth value x for "You drive fast," modus ponens guarantees that the truth value of "Your fuel economy is poor" is between x and 1, regardless of the logic system.
However, suppose we attempt to express reservations about the ~mphcatlon by assigning a reduced truth value, such as .7, to the rule "If you drive fast then your fuel economy is poor." Now, for any of the R and S implicauons discussed, prejudice demands that the truth value of "your fuel economy is poor" must not exceed .7, while presumption demands that the truth value of "You drive fast" must be greater than or equal to .3 (Rl, $2, or $3), greater than or equal to .7 (R3), or smctly greater than zero (R2). Gwen a truth value for "You drive fast" that satisfies presumption, we can use augmented modus ponens to gain reformation about the truth value of "Your fuel economy is poor." For example, if the truth value of "You drive fast" is 8, then the truth value of "your fuel economy is All of these values are precise, m the sense that the lower bound provided by regular modus ponens is equal to the upper bound provided by denial No other truth values for "Your fuel economy is poor" are compatible with a truth value of .8 for "You drive fast" and a truth value of .7 for "If you drive fast then your fuel economy is poor" within the respective logic systems.
Predicate Logic
Fuzzy pre&cate logic allows us to express the concept of a fast speed as a fuzzy predicate defined over the base variable speed measured in miles per hour (mph) The fuzzy predicate "Fast" Is reduced by a fuzzy subset of speeds as shown in Figure 1 A crisp predicate has the value true (1.0) for some elements of its universe of discourse and false (zero) for others. By extension, a fuzzy predicate has a truth value m the range from zero to one for each element of ~ts universe; thus, for example, the predicate "Fast" has the truth value of .8 when the speed is 60 mph. The fuzzy predicate "Poor," whose umverse of discourse IS fuel economy measured in males per gallon (mpg), IS slrmlarly induced by the fuzzy set shown m Figure 2 . For example, the fuzzy predicate "Poor" has a truth value of .8 when fuel economy is 19 mpg.
The ~mphcat~on "If speed is fast then fuel economy is poor" is also a fuzzy predicate, whose domain of definition ~s the Cartesian product of mph and mpg. 
2O 4O
MJle~ per gallon poor + 0 8
The Fuzzy Set of "Poor" Fuel Economies 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 .75 A fuzzy knowledge base often IS expressed as a collecuon of arrays, where each array corresponds to an nmphcation formed by two fuzzy predicates, and each entry in an array gives the truth value of that lmphcauon for the corresponding pair of elements of the respective umverses of discourse. (It ~s possible to assert that an lmphcauon is only partly true, as we did m the case of predicate lognc, but the result zs equivalent to another zmphcatzon with a modzfied consequent that is completely true, so no generahty is gamed.) Suppose that "If speed is fast then fuel economy Is poor" zs one such imphcatlon. Table 3 shows the truth values of the lmphcatzon predicate at selected (x,, ys) pairs, where x, is a particular rate of speed measured in miles per hour and Ys zs a particular level of fuel economy measured in males per gallon, for each of the five logics discussed above Table 4 shows the lower bounds on the truth of the speed component of the pair, defined by the lowest antecedent truth value of x, that could generate the given truth value of the lmphcation within the logic in question (presumption). The greatest lower bound m each row gives the overall presumption derived from the rule, a logical inconsistency occurs if a predicate of speed is asserted that assigns any partacular rate of speed a membership grade less than the membership grade assigned to it by presumption. An example of such a predicate is the datum "You drive very fast." Table 5 shows a sirmlar analysis for prejudice; the least upper bound for each column gwes the overall prejuchce. 
Set Logic
Consider the statement "People who drive fast have poor fuel economy," which asserts that each person belongs to the fuzzy set of people with poor fuel economy at least as much as he or she belongs to the fuzzy set of people who drive fast. To understand this relation, consider the fuzzy set of "fast" speeds and the fuzzy set of "poor" fuel economies shown m Figures 1 and 2 Suppose we want to deduce the fuel economy of a person whose dnvmg speed is 60 mph. Figure 1 displays a cusp value for a speed of 60 mph superimposed upon the membership function of "fast" m the speed universe of discourse. Persons whose speed is 60 belong with degree 0.8 to the set of people who drive fast, since this is the degree of membership of their speed in the set of "fast" speeds Ftgure 2 portrays the membership function of "poor" m the fuel economy umverse of discourse. The persons in the set whose fuel econormes are at least 0 8 compatible with "poor" are shown m Figure 2 to have fuel economies m the crisp interval [0, 19] mpg Thus, we refer that no one who habaually drives 60 mph has a fuel economy better than 19 mpg. Now suppose that the datum regardmg person P's driving habits is "Person P drives very fast." Figure 3 graphs the membership functions of "fast" (the antecedent) and "very fast" (the datum). For any pamcular speed, say 60 mph, we can find a membership grade m person P's speed, m th|s case 0.64, and a "Poor" Fuel Econormes and "Very Poor" Fuel Economies generally different membership grade in the antecedent, m this case 0 8 From this information, which pertains only to 60 mph, we can derive one level set of the fuzzy set of mpg ratings that makes up person P's inferred fuel economy. We begin by finding the level set of the consequent "poor" corresponding to 0.8, the membership grade of 60 mph in the antecedent "fast." This level set is the interval from 0 to 19 mpg If 60 mph were perfectly compaUble with person P's driving, as it was in the previous example, this interval would be perfectly compatible with person P's fuel economy. However, since we now assume that person P's driving is not "fast" but "very fast," 60 mph is only 0.64 compatible with person P's driving, so we infer that the corresponding 0 8 level set of the consequent "poor" is only 0 64 compatible with person P's fuel economy Thus, the upper horizontal line in Figure 4 representing the 0 8 level set of the consequent "poor" is moved down to a membership grade of 0.64; the lower horizontal line represents the 0.64 level set in the inferred fuel economy for person P.
We repeat this process for all possible miles per hour speeds. That is, we find the level set of "poor" corresponding to the membership grade of each particular speed x, mph in the antecedent "fast," and assign this level set a membership in P's inferred fuel economy equal to the membership grade of the Presumpuon and Preju&ce m Logical Inference 381 speed x, in the datum "P drives very fast." These level sets, defined in the fuel economy (mpg) universe of discourse, collectively trace out the lower curve in Figure 4 . Generating the inferred fuel economy by applying the datum "P drives very fast" to the rule "People who drive fast have poor fuel economy" thus allows us to infer that P has very poor fuel economy. . We have examined these modes together with the standard modes of modus ponens and modus tollens in the contexts of propositional logic and predicate logic and have derived the closely related inference modes of presumption and prejudice. In the process, we have uncovered some fundamental difficulties in how fuzzy implication is to be interpreted in a fuzzy expert system given the a priori restrictions placed on the model of the application by presumption and prejudice, and to a lesser extent by confirmation and denial.
One way of escaping these problems is to use a logic based on fuzzy sets rather than on multlvalent truth values, as discussed in the section on set logic The pnncipal drawback of this approach is some loss of expressive flexibility, in effect, the system of fuzzy set logic described here limits the choice of implication operator to a single, rather nonfuzzy choice, the "standard strict" implication operator. In future research, we Intend to relax this restriction somewhat through the use of aspects of Zadeh's concept of "usuahty" [19] 
